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The Bretton Woods agreements, negotiated largely between Britain and the 
United States and signed by forty-four nations in 1944, were remarkable in a 
variety of ways. First, they represented an unprecedented experiment in inter- 
national rule making and institution building-rules  and institutions for post- 
war monetary and financial relations. Second, the Bretton Woods agreements 
were the decisive step in the historic reopening of the world economy. Agree- 
ment was reached, at least in principle, whereby the world economy would 
abandon regional currency and trade groupings in favor of  a liberal multilat- 
eral system. Third, Bretton Woods created an entirely new type of open sys- 
tem-something  that the capitalist world had not seen before. The Anglo- 
American agreements established sophisticated rules that would attempt to 
reconcile openness and trade expansion with  the commitments of  national 
governments to full employment and economic stabilization. At its heart, the 
Bretton Woods accord was an unprecedented experiment in international eco- 
nomic constitution building. Almost a half century later, as an unwieldy group 
of  formerly Communist states seeks to join the liberal world economy, many 
look back at this experiment for guidance. 
These pathbreaking agreements, however, were not inevitable. Indeed, it 
remains a puzzle how the entire set of agreements, rules, and institutions was 
cobbled together. To begin with, the two governments held markedly different 
views during the initial negotiations over postwar trade and monetary rela- 
tions. The most important differences were those between the American offi- 
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cials at the State Department, who wanted to reconstruct an open trading sys- 
tem, and British officials in the wartime cabinet, who wanted to ensure full 
employment and economic stability and were thus contemplating the contin- 
uation of the imperial preference system and bilateral trading. One vision was 
of a nondiscriminatory,  multilateral  trading system; the other,  although  not 
fully articulated, was of preferential economic groupings. 
The agreements were all the more surprising given the ravages and disloca- 
tions of war. World power balances were changing rapidly-the  war had re- 
vealed Britain’s precarious position,  and most of  the industrial world lay in 
ruins. Moreover, the postwar period promised rising economic vulnerabilities 
for  all  nations.  Despite  these  obstacles,  and  the  divergent  and competing 
agendas within and between Britain and the United States, an innovative set 
of postwar arrangements was engineered. Not surprisingly, the leading scholar 
of Anglo-American economic diplomacy characterized the postwar settlement 
as a “political miracle” (Gardner 1985-86,  21). 
Miracles aside, how do we explain this watershed agreement? Was the post- 
war settlement a straightforward expression of  the prevailing distribution of 
power and interests at the end of the war, or do we need to look more closely 
at the forces at work? In its broadest outlines,  the postwar settlement does 
reflect American interests and its overwhelming position after the war. If  we 
are attempting to account  for the fact that the  postwar  system was “open” 
rather than “closed,” the structural variables are probably adequate. The dis- 
tribution of power and interests within and among the United States, Britain, 
and continental Europe set the broad limits on the shape of the postwar inter- 
national economic order. 
This structural explanation, however, leaves two issues unresolved. First, 
there was a range of postwar “orders” that were compatible with an American 
interest in an open world economy. Indeed, a variety of designs for the post- 
war order were advanced by officials within the American government. Why 
did the system take on the features it did rather than a different set? To ask this 
question is really to ask why  interests were defined the  way  they  were  by 
officials at the highest level of government. Why did an American government 
with a State Department that championed laissez-faire and free trade end up 
backing a system more concerned with safeguarding welfare capitalism? 
Second, how did a transatlantic coalition in support of the Anglo-American 
settlement  get cobbled together?  The alternative to the  postwar  settlement 
might not have been just another trade and monetary order, but it might have 
been  stalemate and disorder-this,  after all, was the experience of  the last 
attempt  at  a  postwar  settlement  after  World  War  I. Agreement  at Bretton 
Woods might have failed or gone the way of the Treaty of Versailles, a well- 
intentioned international agreement that fell prey to diverging national inter- 
ests. How was agreement achieved amid the divergent and conflicting national 
and  bureaucratic  positions?  What  was  the  “glue”  that  kept  the  Anglo- 
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Answers to these questions will not emerge from an exclusive focus on the 
underlying conditions of power and interest. I argue that a set of policy ideas 
inspired by Keynesianism and embraced by a group of well-placed British and 
American economists and policy specialists was  crucial in  defining govern- 
ment conceptions of  postwar interests, building coalitions in support of  the 
postwar settlement, and legitimating the exercise of American power, partic- 
ularly as these experts engineered a shift from the contentious trade issues to 
the monetary issues where there was an emerging “middle ground” created by 
Keynesian ideas. These experts and their “new thinking” were important in 
overcoming political stalemate both within and between the two governments. 
Put simply, this group of British and American experts intervened at a partic- 
ularly fluid moment in history to help the British and American political estab- 
lishments identify their interests, thereby creating the bases of postwar eco- 
nomic cooperation. These arguments can be summarized as follows. 
1. As deliberations on the postwar order began during the war,  divergent 
views within and between the British and American political establishments 
posed obstacles to agreement. The most important differences were between 
the State Department’s unalloyed free trade position and the British wartime 
cabinet’s search for arrangements to secure postwar full employment and eco- 
nomic stabilization. 
2. A community of policy specialists and economists assembled within and 
outside the British and American governments during the war articulated a set 
of ideas about monetary order and the organization of the postwar world econ- 
omy that cut through these differences and moved their governments toward 
agreement. In effect, these experts identified a set of normative and technical 
positions that was later embraced by  wartime British and American leaders. 
These experts articulated a more or less coherent governing philosophy of 
postwar economic order: that it should be a managed multilateral order, with 
monetary and trade practices subject to international agreement, and that the 
overall system would work to facilitate Keynesian economic policy and social 
welfare goals. 
3. The British and American policy specialists came to form a loose trans- 
national and transgovernmental “alliance” during wartime negotiations. This 
transatlantic community of experts proved important as it came to alter the 
sequence  of  Anglo-American negotiations. The initial negotiations on  the 
postwar economic order, led by  the State Department, dealt with  trade ar- 
rangements and deadlocked without agreement. British and American Trea- 
sury officials shifted these talks to monetary arrangements, where they shared 
common  views  about  the  postwar  order,  and  agreement  was  eventually 
reached,  undercutting the  State Department’s more conventional, but  also 
controversial, free trade position. 
4. In the broader political setting, the ideas articulated by  these experts 
were important as they defined a “middle ground” between old political divi- 
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mattered in the ratification of the Bretton Woods agreement was not that it was 
based on policy ideas advanced by an expert community but that the policy 
ideas resonated with the larger political environment. The ideas on monetary 
order advanced  by  British and American  experts had political  virtues:  they 
defined  a  middle  ground  between  the  old  and  contentious  alternatives  of 
laissez-faire and interventionism.  These ideas ultimately carried the day be- 
cause  they  created  the  conditions  for larger political coalitions within  and 
between  governments-coalitions  that  themselves reflected  a more general 
postwar reworking of the sociopolitical order in the Western capitalist democ- 
racies. 
I begin  by  sketching  the  characteristics  of  the Anglo-American  postwar 
settlement and discuss the range of  factors involved in any attempt at expla- 
nation.  Following this,  I identify the group of  experts  who were active  in 
shaping  the monetary  agreement,  situating the role of  these specialists and 
their policy  ideas within  the larger structural setting.  In the following  sec- 
tions, I trace the course of Anglo-American negotiations-from  early stale- 
mate over postwar trade arrangements  to the Bretton Woods settlement. Fi- 
nally, I discuss the central ways that policy expertise mattered in shaping the 
Anglo-American agreement.  I emphasize the way that the community of ex- 
perts served to articulate  a “middle ground” between  previously  unbridged 
positions and, as a consequence, provided opportunities for new political co- 
alitions (both within and across nations). 
3.1  Explaining the Anglo-American  Settlement 
The Anglo-American  agreement on the international economic order, or- 
ganized  around  a  set of  monetary  and  trade  schemes,  amounted to a truly 
unique  historical  creation.  The agreement  embodied  a  distinctive  blend  of 
laissez-faire and interventionism. It allowed the operation of a relatively open 
system of  trade and payments  as well as arrangements to support domestic 
full employment  and a social welfare provision.  This evolving synthesis of 
liberal economic and social welfare goals is captured in John Ruggie’s notion 
of “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie 1983). The international economic regimes 
of  the postwar period were built on a historic political compromise: “Unlike 
the  economic  nationalism  of  the  thirties,  the  international economic  order 
would be multilateral in character; but unlike the liberalism of the gold stan- 
dard  and free trade,  its multilateralism would be predicated  upon domestic 
interventionism” (Ruggie, 1991 ,  203).  I 
The forces that shaped this postwar settlement were obviously many and 
complex.  A  “first cut” would  focus on the underlying  structures of power 
1, For an excellent discussion of these political compromises and the economic lessons that 
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capabilities.2  According to this view, the postwar economic order reflected the 
efforts of the United States, as an ascending “hegemonic” power and victor in 
war,  to build a system congenial to its intere~ts.~  The most fundamental dy- 
namic at work in the economic diplomacy of  the 1940s, therefore, really in- 
volved attempts by  the United States to break  down the barriers to global 
economic openness, making compromises where necessary. As Charles Maier 
argues, “The central conflict defining international political economy from 
World War I until about 1950 was not that between American and Soviet alter- 
natives, between capitalism and communism. . . . Viewed  over the whole 
half century, the American international economic effort of the era of  stabili- 
zation centered on overcoming British, Japanese, and especially German al- 
ternatives to a pluralist, market-economy liberalism” (Maier 1987, 183). 
The commanding position of  the United  States, and the hegemonic re- 
sources available to it, did set the basic terms of negotiations. European gov- 
ernments, including Great Britain, as we  shall see, had  very mixed views 
about the postwar order. American efforts to overcome European obstacles 
and induce acceptance of a liberal order required a series of compromises and 
delays in the implementation of agreements, largely because of the economic 
and political vulnerabilities of a war-ravaged Britain and continental E~rope.~ 
Nonetheless, the United States used its resources to influence the direction of 
policy change.  Moreover, American efforts to recast the political and eco- 
nomic institutions of Japan and Germany after the war reflected perhaps the 
ultimate exercise of hegemonic power-interventions  that in the years to fol- 
low had profound consequences for the stable functioning of a liberal multi- 
lateral order (see Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). Hegemonic power, however, 
has limitations as an explanation for the emergence of liberal multilateralism 
after the war (see Ode11  1989, 294-95).  Coercive efforts, such as the British 
Loan, were less successful than often thought. Moreover, as we shall see, the 
substantive content of the system was shaped by Great Britain as well as by 
the United States and in ways that would be unanticipated by  simple consid- 
erations of power (Ikenberry 1989). 
In addition to focusing on hegemonic power, explanations might also trace 
Anglo-American agreement to convergent shifts in underlying national eco- 
nomic  interests.  As  I will argue in a later section, there  were underlying 
2. Robert Gilpin (1981) provides perhaps the most powerful and parsimonious explanation for 
the organization and reworking of the international order. A prevailing international order is the 
reflection of the underlying distribution of material capabilities of states within the system. Over 
time,  that  distribution  of power shifts,  leading to ruptures in the  system,  hegemonic war, and 
an eventual reorganization of the international order that reflects the new underlying power capa- 
bilities. 
3. Hegemonic power is a term used to describe a state that possesses a preponderance of power 
resources-economic,  political,  and military-thereby  occupying a commanding international 
position. This concept is discussed in Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990). 
4. On the bargain struck between the United States and Europe after World War  I1 over multi- 
lateralism and regional integration, see Cohen (1974). 160  G. John Ikenberry 
economic interests in both the United States and Britain that pointed in the 
direction of  a relatively open system,  particularly if  protections and  safe- 
guards could be provided. What is missing in this explanation, however, is an 
account of  how  these structural conditions manifested themselves. To  argue 
that a particular outcome is economically functional or in the interest of  a 
group or  nation is not, in itself, an explanation for that outcome. This is par- 
ticularly important because, in both Britain and the United States, there were, 
as economic planning and negotiations got under way during the war, substan- 
tial obstacles to agreement on even the most general outlines for the postwar 
economic order. 
The argument of this paper is that a transatlantic group of economists and 
policy specialists, united by a common set of policy ideas and a shared view 
that past economic failures could be avoided by innovative proposals, led their 
governments toward  agreement  by  identifying  a  set  of  common  Anglo- 
American interests. This argument builds on a body of  literature that links 
international cooperation to the activities of policy experts and evolving eco- 
nomic ideas. One strand of this literature argues that the convergence of con- 
ceptual frameworks among economic experts is a necessary precondition for 
successful cooperation (see Cooper 1989; Eichengreen and Uzan 1990).5  An- 
other strand of the literature makes similar arguments but focuses on the role 
of  transnational policy communities (or “epistemic communities”) in foster- 
ing cooperation. The argument here is that, under conditions of uncertainty, 
when government leaders do not know what positions to take in economic, 
scientific, and other technical policy areas, transnational communities of  ex- 
perts can intervene decisively to shape policy and lead governments toward 
interstate agreement (Haas 1992). A final strand of this literature has sought 
to explore the more general relation between evolving bodies of  knowledge 
and political outcomes. Work in this area has emphasized the manner in which 
ideas help shape the interests of  states, groups, and classes, thereby creating 
possibilities for new political coalitions and outcomes (Hall 1989; Goldstein 
and Keohane, forthcoming). 
Agreement on the postwar monetary order was fostered by  a momentary 
community of  experts engaged in negotiations who, despite the many differ- 
ences between them,  did  share a view  about the desirable organization of 
monetary relations and the world economic order. In  1945, Alvin Hansen, a 
leading  American  economist  engaged  in  postwar  planning,  argued  that 
“among the many contrasts between World War I and World War 11 nothing is 
more  remarkable than  the profound change  in  economic  thinking.”  After 
World  War  I, the main purpose of  economic policy was  to “reconstitute as 
rapidly as possible the automatic forces in economic life. The drive all around 
was a return, in the broad essentials, to laissez faire” (Hansen 1945, 199). By 
5. These authors emphasize convergence of conceptual frameworks as a determinant of  coop- 
eration, but they provide different stones of how such convergence does or does not take place. 161  The Political Origins of  Bretton Woods 
the late 1930s, Hansen argued, all this had changed. A new social purpose 
infused postwar planning the second time around. Understanding how  this 
“new thinking” got established and shaped government policy and the Anglo- 
American agreement is our task. 
3.2  The Emergence of an International Policy Community 
The Bretton Woods agreement is often seen as the result of  the ideas and 
diplomacy of John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White.6 Indeed, these 
economists, particularly Keynes, were pivotal figures in devising monetary 
plans, and they led their delegations in the celebrated Anglo-American nego- 
tiations during the war. But they were also part of a larger collection of econ- 
omists and policy specialists who were located in the British and American 
Treasury Departments, in other government offices, and in universities and 
policy institutions. While many of the beliefs held by this loose community 
of  specialists reflected the evolving views  of  professional economists, the 
community itself was given form by  the demands of  British and American 
governments to deliberate on postwar economic matters. The process of post- 
war planning on both sides of  the Atlantic served to organize and stimulate 
the activities of  these policy specialists. We  can trace the contours of  this 
assemblage of  experts and situate it within the larger institutions of  British 
and American government. 
3.2.1  An Emerging Consensus 
In both Britain and the United States, most of the ideas that made their way 
into the Bretton Woods agreement were widely shared among what could be 
called  “liberal  minded”  international  economists,  many  of  whom  were 
Keynesians and  whose  views,  more  than  anything else,  reflected  lessons 
learned from recent historical experience as well as the ongoing evolution in 
professional economic thought. This consensus among economists and mon- 
etary specialists was less the reflection of the common acceptance of a specific 
economic doctrine or theory than it was a more or less common professional 
reaction to the recent upheavals and malaise in the world economy. Out of 
these lessons grew agreement on the broad outlines of  a desirable postwar 
economy and the general policies and institutions that would sustain it. 
6. The definitive history of  this episode remains Gardner (1980). Gardner’s interpretation of the 
events places much more emphaiss than mine does on the differences between the American and 
the British plans as they were advanced, respectively, by White and Keynes. While Gardner sees 
the Anglo-American negotiations more as a clash between officials representing different national 
interests, I see the expert negotiators as finding common cause in devising a plan that would reflect 
their economic thinking and that the American Congress would be willing to ratify. A more recent 
history of  this period also stresses British and American differences (see Woods  1990). For a 
sophisticated political  history of  the events that also stresses the role of experts in promoting 
agreement, see Eckes (1975). For a fairly straightforward and detailed history of the negotiations 
relying primarily on British documents, see Van Dormael(l978). 162  G. John Ikenberry 
This policy consensus included rough agreement on three essentials. First, 
there was a common belief  in the desirability of currency  stability and the 
convertibility of currencies. Convertibility would be ensured by the abolition 
of  exchange controls and restrictions.  Disagreement could be found on the 
role of gold and other mechanisms for establishing stability in exchange rela- 
tions,  but  currency  exchange adjustments,  when  necessary  to correct pay- 
ments imbalances, were to be subject to international agreement. Behind the 
thinking of these specialists was the view that monetary arrangements must 
seek to avoid the political and economic instability of the interwar period. “In 
the interval between the wars,” Keynes argued in an early draft of his mone- 
tary proposals, “the world explored in rapid succession almost, as it were, in 
an intensive laboratory experiment all the alternative false approaches to the 
solution” (Keynes 1980, 25:22). The painful adjustments of the gold standard 
ruled out policy ideas of this sort. The currency fluctuations, exchange con- 
trols,  and  discriminatory  policies  of  the  1930s also discredited ideas asso- 
ciated with floating exchange rates (Ode11 1989, 299). 
Second, the American and British experts agreed that some form of inter- 
national reserves would need to be available as short-term assistance so as to 
allow expansionary  solutions to balance of payments deficits.  American and 
British experts, as we shall see, disagreed over how generous this fund would 
be and over the obligations of creditor and deficit nations (disagreements that 
emerged more from divergent domestic circumstances than professional judg- 
ments). But they agreed that international stabilization funds should be avail- 
able so as to allow governments to pursue multilateral  and expansionary so- 
lutions to capital and trade imbalances (Eckes 1975). 
Third, and most generally, the Anglo-American specialists, some of whom 
were inspired by Keynes’s pioneering work, agreed  that new techniques of 
international economic management  should be devised  that could  reconcile 
the movement of capital and trade with policies that promote stable and full 
employment economies. There was need for new levels of international man- 
agement and supervision of national monetary  and trade policies. Thus, al- 
though these experts generally favored an open world economy, it was also to 
be a managed world economy, and in this sense their ideas differed from the 
policy  views found in the State Department favoring free trade. This differ- 
ence was articulated by Harry Dexter White in  1942: “The theoretical basis 
for the belief still so widely held, that interference with trade and with capital 
and gold movements, etc., are harmful, are hangovers from a nineteenth cen- 
tury creed, which held that international economic adjustments, if left alone, 
would work themselves out toward an ‘equilibrium’ with a minimum of harm 
to world  trade  and  prosperity.  It  is  doubtful  whether  that  belief  was  ever 
sound” (White 1942). In contrast to the thinking of Cordell Hull and the State 
Department, these  specialists  agreed  with  White  that  international  invest- 
ment, capital movements, exchange rate parities, and commodity prices were 
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purpose of the international stabilization fund and the other proposed postwar 
institutions was  to separate legitimate from illegitimate economic practices 
(White 1942). 
These views shared by British and American specialists reflected changing 
economic thinking, largely stimulated by  the turmoil of the 1930s. But they 
also reflected a broader confluence of intellectual and political thought. The 
Keynesian policy revolution was still spreading in British and American pol- 
icy circles, but its political consequences had already taken hold: politicians 
and government officials, equipped with  modem tools of  economic policy, 
were  increasingly capable  of  managing  national  economies.  As  a  conse- 
quence, they would need to attend, more than ever before, to policies that 
promoted full employment and social welfare-a  responsibility formally ac- 
cepted by  the British government in May  1944 with the publication of  the 
White Paper on Employment Policy (Beveridge 1944). Innovations in eco- 
nomic and social policy allowed politicians to promise more to the electorate, 
but they also meant that politicians would need to deliver the socioeconomic 
goods (Skidelsky 1977). Such new socioeconomic goals of government were 
at odds with the deflationary discipline of the gold standard: a policy of con- 
traction and unemployment was not a satisfactory solution for deficit nations. 
“Even if  this policy had its advantages,” Keynes wrote in  1944, “it is surely 
obviously out of the question and might easily mean the downfall of our pres- 
ent system of democratic government” (Keynes 1980,27:373-74). 
The ideas of British and American monetary planners also resonated with 
the revival of  American internationalism in the late 1930s, a process that in- 
volved the slow reorientation of American foreign policy. One benchmark of 
the earlier thinking came in the first year of  the Roosevelt administration. 
When, at the London Economic Conference of  1933, Franklin Roosevelt de- 
clared that the “sound internal economic system of a nation is a greater factor 
in its  well-being than  the price of  its currency,” the message was  that  the 
United  States would  take  little responsibility for developments within  the 
world economy (quoted in Kindleberger 1986, 216). By the time the United 
States joined the war, official thinking had changed, and Roosevelt advanced 
the claim at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 that “the economic health 
of every country is a proper matter of  concern to all its neighbors, near and 
distant” (U.S. Department of  State  1948, 71). The change in  Roosevelt’s 
views reflected the renewal of  internationalist thinking in  American foreign 
economic policy. 
The rise of  Keynesianism and American internationalism, still under way 
as Anglo-American postwar planning began, provided a stimulus to that plan- 
ning as well as a ready audience. These new attitudes contrasted sharply with 
those that attended planning after the First World War, changes that were noted 
by Jacob Viner, a leading American economist and postwar planner, in  1942: 
“There is wide agreement today that major depressions, mass unemployment, 
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them.” Moreover, Viner held, there is “wide agreement also that it is extraor- 
dinarily difficult, if  not outright impossible, for any country to cope alone 
with the problems of cyclical booms and depressions . . . while there is good 
prospect that with international cooperation  . . . the problem of the business 
cycle and of mass unemployment can be largely solved” (Viner 1942, 168). A 
remarkable  sense  of  economic  possibility  and  social  purpose  infused  the 
thinking of Viner and the other American and British planners. 
3.2.2  American Policy Experts 
The American group of  experts was based, during the Roosevelt adminis- 
tration, in the Treasury Department. Under the leadership of Henry Morgen- 
thau, a group of international economists was assembled within the depart- 
ment in the mid-1930s to work on exchange rate stabilization. Jacob Viner 
and Harry Dexter White were leading members of this group (Rees 1973,62). 
The early efforts of the group culminated in the Tripartite Agreement of  1936, 
which established at least the principle of international monetary cooperation 
(Blum 1959, 131-34).  By 1941, White has risen at the Treasury Department 
to take overall responsibility for foreign economic policy. Soon thereafter, in 
December 1941, Morgenthau directed White to prepare a memorandum on 
the establishment of  an  inter-Allied  stabilization  fund-a  fund that  would 
“provide the basis for postwar international monetary arrangements” (Blum 
The ideas in White’s original plan were ones generally shared by many of 
White’s professional  and departmental colleagues. In the late  1930s, newly 
trained  economists,  mostly  from  Harvard and embracing Keynesian  ideas, 
had begun to find places in the U.S. government (Galbraith 1971). This pro- 
cess of  recruitment was set in motion by several key officials in the Roosevelt 
administration, most important among whom were Maniner Eccles, chairman 
of  the Federal  Reserve,  and Lauchlin Currie, a Harvard economist  whom 
Eccles had attracted to the Federal Reserve. Cume, in turn, became an impor- 
tant conduit for the recruitment of Keynesian economists into the federal bu- 
reaucracy (Salant 1989, 40; Stein 1969; Sweezy 1972, 116-24;  May 1981). 
By the start of the war, Keynesians had come to occupy positions in the Bu- 
reau of the Budget, the Department of Commerce, and the Treasury. During 
the war, they also assumed positions at the Office of Price Administration and 
the National Resources Planning Board; the latter was also involved in post- 
war planning (Weir 1989, 56; Clawson 1981). Although Henry Morgenthau 
was not a Keynesian, key posts within the Treasury Department came to be 
occupied by  those who were (Block 1977, 39). Taken together, when work 
began at the Treasury on postwar monetary proposals, the experts surrounding 
White shared his basic views concerning the need for far-reaching and inno- 
vative economic proposals. After the White plan was drafted, interdepartmen- 
tal  technical  discussions,  in  which  primarily  economists and  lawyers  (not 
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businessmen or bankers) took part, provided a vehicle for expert deliberations 
within the government (Eckes 1975, 60). 
This community of experts extended outside government as well. Most of 
the important ideas that found their way  into the White proposal were also 
discussed during the war at a series of expert planning and discussion groups 
sponsored by  the Council on Foreign Relations. This study group, the Eco- 
nomics and Financial Group, which was part of the council’s War and Peace 
Studies Project, was lead by Alvin Hansen and Jacob Viner, and it provided 
an  extraordinary  vehicle  for  the  concentration of  expertise  and  planning 
(Domhoff  1990). The Economics and Financial Group also provided an irn- 
portant forum for discussions with British economists after monetary plan- 
ning got under way in 1941  .’ 
Most of the experts who worked on postwar monetary planning (inside or 
outside the Treasury Department) were associated in one way or another with 
the Economics and Financial Group. Viner played a key role in developing 
the rationale for the White plan, and Hansen, a leading Keynesian economist, 
was involved in revising the proposals (Domhoff 1990). The group also com- 
missioned its own studies dealing with various dimensions of postwar recon- 
struction and international economic relations. In both the specific ideas re- 
lated  to  monetary  stabilization  and  the  broader  discussions  of  postwar 
economic reconstruction,  the  planners  elaborated a  vision  of  British  and 
American cooperation. 
3.2.3  British Policy Experts 
The British community of  economic experts concerned with postwar rnon- 
etary planning was overshadowed by John Maynard Keynes. After the First 
World War, Keynes had written the well-known polemic The Economic Con- 
sequences  of the Peace, which harshly  criticized the terms of  the postwar 
settlement and forecast destructive trade and monetary policies and the even- 
tual collapse of  the European economy (Keynes 1920). Two decades later, the 
prophetic nature of Keynes’s views, along with the success of  his own pio- 
neering theory, left him in a commanding position to influence British postwar 
policy. During the war, Keynes was given an office at the Treasury Department 
to work on wartime economic administration and financial negotiations. As 
postwar planning began  at the Treasury, other economists,  such as Lionel 
Robbins and James Meade, were actively involved in the deliberations (Weir 
1989,55;  Gardner 1972,24). 
British  officials involved in planning shared the views of  the American 
economists at the Treasury Department that currency stability must be  an- 
chored in international agreement. “Exchange depreciation,” Keynes wrote 
7. Interview, William Diebold, Jr., New York,  14 August 1990. (Diebold was research secre- 
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Jacob Viner in  1943, “is nothing  like as fashionable  as it used to be,  and 
experience has taught many countries what a futile expedient it is except in 
quite special circumstances” (Keynes 1980, 25:323). Yet the single most strik- 
ing lesson that the British economists working on postwar monetary arrange- 
ments shared was the belief that the currency exchange commitments must 
not undermine expansionary domestic policies.  By the  mid- 1930s, British 
economists (and many politicians as well) had come to believe that the return 
to gold in 1925 was a decision that brought economic misery to the domestic 
economy and that the departure from gold in 1931 was associated with recov- 
ery (Clarke 1977; Hall 1986, 49-50).  The overriding view of British econo- 
mists in government during the war was that social welfare  and economic 
management  must dictate postwar international economic plans, rather than 
the other way around. 
While planning experts formed independent communities in Britain and the 
United States, they were also connected as a transnational community. Inter- 
action between British and American experts had several dimensions. First, 
there were the official discussions (and later negotiations) between White and 
Keynes  and their  associates that took place between  1942 and the Bretton 
Woods conference. Many of these meetings were technical in nature and took 
place  after the British  and American  plans had been drafted  (Eckes  1975, 
chap. 4). Second, there were also more informal discussions among the rele- 
vant British and American economists, several of which took place under the 
auspices  of  the  Council  on  Foreign  Relations’  Economics  and  Financial 
Group.  In these and other settings, it appears that Viner and Hansen were 
important in facilitating  informal discussion between British and American 
planners. Viner was a close friend of Lionel Robbins, a British economist who 
was an associate of Keynes and who was also involved in postwar planning.* 
Hansen made an important visit to Britain in the fall of 1941, presenting pro- 
posals for Anglo-American economic cooperation of a very different sort than 
those being advanced by the State Department (Harrod  1951, 527-28).  The 
discussions between British economists and members of the Economics and 
Financial Group, which were carried out in 1941 and 1942, provided useful 
communication between planners. 
There were monetary specialists who were not part of this emerging policy 
community. The American banking community was supportive of more tradi- 
tional plans than those being fashioned at the American and British Treasury 
Departments,  such as proposals  for ad hoc stabilization agreements tied to 
gold. Another proposal, advanced by Professor John Williams, involved what 
amounted to an extension of the 1936 Tripartite Stabilization Agreement (see 
Horsefield  1969,  16-18).  Regardless  of  their  technical  merit,  specialists 
wielding proposals of this sort tended to be vulnerable within the Roosevelt 
administration, whose New Dealers were distrustful of the conservative bank- 
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ing community. It is revealing that these more conventional policy specialists 
were  not part  of the loop.  Morgenthau recruited  not just  specialists to the 
Treasury but specialists with a New Deal planning orientation. Morgenthau 
did not like Keynesian fiscal thinking, but he had an even stronger dislike for 
the  banking  community.  These  considerations  helped  shape the  character 
of the experts who were positioned close to the center of policy-making within 
the Roosevelt administration. 
To  sum  up,  a  community  of  British  and  American  economic planners 
emerged during the war. The efforts of government officials in Britain and the 
United States to get postwar planning  started helped stimulate the thinking 
and give organizational form to the experts. The colonizing of parts of the 
British and American bureaucracies by Keynesian economists also strength- 
ened the sense of  community among these experts. Many of  the views that 
these Anglo-American experts held, particularly those concerning past mon- 
etary experience,  were  also shared by  a larger international community of 
economists and policy-makers. As we shall see, there were also differences of 
view among the British and American monetary planners, but even these dif- 
ferences did not always break along national lines. On the basic issues of  the 
postwar monetary order, the community of economic planners shared a core 
set of beliefs. 
3.3  Situating the Role of the Policy Community 
To locate a role for the policy community that guided British and American 
negotiations during the war, it is important to appreciate the wide-ranging and 
frequently antithetical views on the postwar order that spilled across the Brit- 
ish and American political establishments. In the United States, these views 
ranged from the free trade proposals of the State Department to the views of 
New Deal planners who favored expanded government management of the 
economy over institutions to promote the free flow of trade and capital. Lurk- 
ing behind American wartime debates was a domestically minded and tight- 
fisted Congress.  In Britain,  the splits were even more profound, not  least 
because the virtues of  a liberal multilateral system were less apparent. Con- 
servatives  were  reluctant  to abandon  the  imperial  preference  system,  and 
many on the left saw an open economy to be a dangerous threat to economic 
planning and social welfare policies. Situated between these groups were the 
economic advisers to the wartime government who were not eager to return to 
bilateral trade and the preference system but who thought that such an option 
might be necessary to protect Britain’s postwar payments balance and, in any 
event, might be used to extract concessions from the United States (i.e., to 
agree to a  more  forgiving  and  expansionary  system-precisely  the  “new 
9. Williams was initially involved in the discussions of  the Economics and Financial Group at 
the Council on Foreign Relations, but, perhaps reflecting his absence of agreement with the “new 
thinking,” he soon dropped out (interview, William Diebold, New York, 14 August 1990). 168  G. John Ikenberry 
thinking”  that  Keynes and  his American  counterparts  were  seeking to  de- 
velop). 
Before we examine those competing views and the initial deadlock in ne- 
gotiations that they produced, it is important to establish a point made earlier. 
That point is that the underlying structures of power and interests set the broad 
parameters around which an agreement could be built, but they were not im- 
peratives that inevitably produced the agreement. 
The United  States did have a basic and increasingly  robust interest  in  an 
open system, and key American economic and political elites recognized this 
fact.  In the  1930s, with the apparent collapse of  the international economy 
and the emergence of German and Japanese regional economic blocs, Ameri- 
can statesmen and intellectuals debated the plausibility of regional alternatives 
to an  open world  economy.  These issues grew  in  importance  in  the  early 
1940s, as political  elites  debated  whether the  United  States should get in- 
volved in the war.  Could the United States remain  a going concern within a 
Western  hemispheric  bloc? The academic  culmination  of  this  debate came 
with the work of Nicholas Spykman, who articulated what became the con- 
ventional wisdom, that a hemispheric bloc would not be sufficient to protect 
American  economic  and  geopolitical  interests  (Spykman  1942).  Military 
planners in the War and Navy Departments during the war also began to con- 
ceive of  postwar American strategic interests in global terms (Leffler 1984). 
Beginning  in  1941, similar views emerged in discussions among economic 
and political experts at the Council on Foreign Relations on the nature of the 
Grand Area, that is, the core regions of the world that the United States de- 
pended  on for its economic viability  (Council on Foreign Relations  1941). 
The attack  on Pearl  Harbor  only  strengthened this evolving view:  that  the 
United States would need to work with Great Britain to reintegrate as much of 
the world  economy  as possible. Moreover,  in the two decades between  the 
world wars, the internationally oriented sectors of the American economy had 
expanded considerably, increasing the nation’s stakes in a wider liberal world 
order (Frieden  1988).  These economic  and  national  security  debates  and 
underlying economic  shifts all pointed  in the same direction and reinforced 
liberal international thinking among political elites. 
The underlying  set  of  British  interests  is  more  difficult to  specify. Fred 
Block argues that British participation in an American-sponsored system was 
not inevitable. He describes the central alternative to liberal multilateralism as 
“national capitalism”-a  closed system where state intervention and planning 
would be used to sustain full employment and industrial  capacity. Block ar- 
gues that “there is good reason to believe that after the war, there might have 
been  substantial experiments with national capitalism among the developed 
capitalist countries.” He goes on to argue that “the reason these controls were 
not elaborated into full-scale experiments with national capitalism was that it 
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of national capitalist experiments and to gain widespread cooperation in the 
restoration of an open world economy” (Block 1977,9). 
This view is invoked by those who argue that the British (and other Euro- 
pean nations) had political values and economic interests that might have led 
to alternative (e.g., regional or bilateral) postwar arrangements if not for the 
hegemonic power of the United States. There remains a historical dispute on 
this matter,  but the strong version of the argument,  that Britain could have 
remained within its Commonwealth  and imperial system, is probably incor- 
rect (see contrasting views in Rowland  1976). The United States did confront 
considerable resistance to liberal multilateralism in Europe (see Watt  1983). 
European reservations  about a liberal economic order were part of  broader 
differences between the United  States and Europe over such matters as em- 
pire, spheres of influence, and regionalism. 
The United  States did meet considerable resistance to its liberal postwar 
agenda, but it is less clear that Britain (and continental Europe) had viable 
alternatives to participation in an American-sponsored system. What were the 
alternatives? It would have been very difficult and costly for the British to have 
constructed an alternative system organized around bilateral trade and the im- 
perial preference system. 
British political  elites  were of  divided  opinion;  however,  they  had  little 
choice but to cooperate with the United States. For those British officials who 
held this view, their task was to use what intellectual and political capacities 
Britain had to shape the agreement in ways that served their socioeconomic 
goals and to find ways to secure that agreement within a conflictual and frag- 
mented political landscape. 
Underlying structures of power and interest provide enough information to 
explain the fact that the postwar system was more or less open. But this infor- 
mation is not enough to explain the character of that open system. Nor is it 
enough to explain  how the many conflicting  political  positions  were recon- 
ciled in reaching an agreement, even if  we agree that Britain and the United 
States have common “objective” interests in a liberal multilateral system. It is 
useful to sketch these conflicting positions within and between the British and 
American  governments  and then trace the  evolution of  agreement between 
Keynes and American negotiators. 
3.4  Competing Anglo-American  Plans for the Postwar Order 
Economic and foreign policy elites in both countries ranged widely in their 
views about the postwar economic order. The crucial antagonists in these de- 
bates were American officials, mostly in the State Department, who were in- 
tent on constructing an open and nondiscriminatory trading system and British 
government officials who, for reasons of  political  expediency and economic 
vulnerability, resisted the abandonment of the imperial preference system and 170  G. John Ikenberry 
the sterling bloc. The debate during the war was really a continuation of con- 
troversies that had emerged in the  1930s when  various governments experi- 
mented with regional (or, as in the case of Britain, imperial) traded and cur- 
rency blocs (Rowland 1976,200). 
The most vocal advocates within the Roosevelt administration of  a system 
of free trade and multilateralism came from the State Department, led by  Sec- 
retary Cordell Hull, his assistant, Leo Pasvolsky, and the Division of Com- 
mercial Policy  and Trade Agreements, headed by  Harry Hawkins (Penrose 
1953, 15). There is a consistency in the orientation of Cordell Hull and other 
State Department officials that runs throughout the Roosevelt period. This was 
the conviction that an open international trading system was central to Amer- 
ican economic and security interests and that such a system was fundamental 
to the maintenance of peace. These liberal ideas, well anchored in American 
history, were given expression in the Atlantic Charter, signed by  Roosevelt 
and Churchill during the war. 
The consistency of the State Department position could be found in its on- 
going opposition to the British imperial preference system. According to Cor- 
dell Hull, the 1932 Ottawa Agreements represented “the greatest injury, in a 
commercial way,  that has been inflicted on this country since I have been in 
public life” (Van Dormael 1978, 25). Hull believed that the bilateralism and 
economic blocs of the 1930s, practiced by  Britain (but also by Germany and 
Japan), were a root cause of the instability of the period and the onset of war 
(Pollard 1985, 11-12).  Charged with responsibility for commercial policy, the 
State Department championed tariff reduction agreements, most prominently 
in the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act and the 1938 U.S.-British trade 
agreement (see Gardner 1964). 
Another camp within the Roosevelt administration was composed of  eco- 
nomic planners and New Dealers, and their central concern was the domestic 
economy. This group,  which included Harry Hopkins, Vice-Resident Wal- 
lace,  and  Keynesian  economists  within  the  National  Resources Planning 
Board, was interested in an expanded role for government in the management 
of  the economy in the service of  full employment and social welfare. This 
collection of officials, as Fred Block argues, had little sympathy with the State 
Department’s multilateral vision: “They favored a world system made up of 
national capitalisms because of  the priority they gave to the pursuit of  full 
employment. They believed that the maintenance of  high levels of  employ- 
ment and the development of national planning throughout the world should 
take precedence over the opening of economies to the free flow of investment 
and trade” (Block 1977, 36-37).  At the same time, these officials were not 
isolationists. They favored international arrangements to foster expansionary 
domestic economic policies and institutions to channel capital to underdevel- 
oped areas. Thus, in the Roosevelt administration, there were these two com- 
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Before World War 11,  British attitudes toward the imperial preference sys- 
tem split largely along party lines (Gardner  1980; Woods 1990). The core of 
the Conservative party favored the  maintenance  of  empire, and the Ottawa 
preference system was part of these special relations: “A section of the Con- 
servative Party valued the system of preferential duties on Empire goods as a 
force  making  for solidarity  within the  British Commonwealth  of  Nations” 
(Penrose  1953,  19). These individuals stressed the importance of  Common- 
wealth ties: it was a symbol of Great Britain’s power status. “In Britain,” Roy 
Harrod writes, “some resented the idea [of dismantling imperial preferences] 
mainly on sentimental grounds that we should be ’asked to abrogate this valu- 
able symbol of Commonwealth and Empire unity” (Harrod 1951, 515). More- 
over, it was the Commonwealth nations, such as Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand,  that had risen in support of a beleaguered  Britain during the war. 
These conservatives identified British interests with those of the  Common- 
wealth (Penrose 1953, 20). Others in the Conservative party were less enthu- 
siastic about imperial preferences.  Churchill and his followers were sympa- 
thetic with the free trade position. According to Penrose, although Churchill 
“acquiesced in a certain degree of protectionism as a fait accompli, he still 
thought there was a general presumption on the side of free trade and felt no 
enthusiasm for the system of Empire preferences adopted at Ottawa” (Penrose 
1953, 20). His major consideration was to protect the unity of his ruling coa- 
lition and to push on with the war. 
The forces of support and opposition to the imperial preference system be- 
gan to change  during the war.  The deterioration of  the country’s economic 
position made preferences more attractive to some British officials who other- 
wise would not support discriminatory trade practices (Penrose 1953, 14). To 
some of  these officials the preference system might be a way of protecting 
Britain’s payments balance after the war, at least in the short term, particularly 
if  the  international  economy fell into recession.  They realized that turning 
away from multilateral trade and payments would mean relying on trade re- 
strictions and currency controls. While splitting the world into blocs, a bloc 
system would insulate Britain from low-cost foreign competition and the de- 
flationary effects of an American recession.  Eckes points to the groups that 
favored this option: “In Britain an unlikely coalition of socialists and conserv- 
ative imperialists favored this alternative-the  socialists to achieve full em- 
ployment  and domestic  reform, the  imperialists to preserve  traditional  ties 
with the Commonwealth.  But although these interests were articulate and en- 
joyed some support in the cabinet, where Churchill and Beaverbrook attached 
considerable importance to preserving the empire, the rigid restrictionist view 
had little appeal among official economists” (Eckes 1975, 64-65). 
Other officials were more skeptical of bilateral trade and the preference sys- 
tem, even as a fall-back option, but they saw threatening recourse to that op- 
tion as a way of gaining bargaining leverage with the United States (Harrod 172  G. John Ikenberry 
1951). To these officials, the only real option was to cooperate with the United 
States, but  they  wanted to do so in  a  manner that  would  allow  Britain  to 
achieve its economic objectives.’O 
To  sum up, as discussions began during the war, there were striking divi- 
sions between and within the British and American governments. In Washing- 
ton, the State Department articulated a remarkably stark vision of nineteenth- 
century free trade.  In London, the  wartime government,  worried  about the 
stability of its political  coalition  and the fragility  of its impending postwar 
economic  position,  entertained  notions  of  regional and managed economic 
arrangements.  These differences became apparent in the earliest discussions 
of the postwar order. 
3.5  From ’lkade Stalemate to Monetary Agreement 
The first exchanges  on postwar  economic  questions  between  the  United 
States and Great Britain were triggered in the summer of 1941 during negoti- 
ations over Lend-Lease,  and disagreements surfaced immediately.  State De- 
partment officials wanted to use this occasion to secure a British promise that 
they would  open up the imperial preference system. British officials resisted 
and sought to tie the dismantling of discriminatory practices to a larger pro- 
gram of postwar reconstruction that assured economic expansion and employ- 
ment stability. The principles and mechanisms of that larger settlement, how- 
ever, remained obscure. 
Discussions  began  in the summer of  1941 when John Maynard Keynes, 
who had been appointed as adviser to the chancellor of the Exchequer, arrived 
in Washington to negotiate the terms of the Lend-Lease agreement.  But the 
visit only underscored the differences in official British and American thinking 
(Harrod  1951; Gardner 1964). Disagreement centered on the proposed terms 
of  Article VII, which set forth the framework for the postwar  settlement of 
mutual  aid  obligations.  The article  provided  that,  in  meeting  these  Lend- 
Lease obligations,  no conditions should be laid down to obstruct commerce 
and that measures should be taken to reduce trade barriers and eliminate pref- 
erential duties.  In a meeting at the State Department,  Keynes asked if  this 
provision “raised the question of imperial preferences and exchange and other 
trade controls in the post-war period” (Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1941, 3:  11). Assistant Secretary Acheson acknowledged that it did, although 
it  was  not  meant  to impose  unilateral  obligations  on the  British  Empire. 
Keynes strongly objected to this provision: “He said that he did not see how 
the British could make such a commitment in good faith; that it would require 
an imperial conference and that it saddled upon the future an ironclad formula 
from the Nineteenth Century. He said that it contemplated the impossible and 
10. This was the position of  most officials at the British Foreign Office and the Treasury (see 
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hopeless task of  returning to a gold standard where international trade was 
controlled by mechanical monetary devices and which had proved completely 
futile” (Foreign Relations of  the United States, 1941, 3:12). Keynes argued 
that, in order to maintain economies in balance without great excesses of  im- 
ports or exports, countries in the postwar period would need exchange con- 
trols, precisely the types of measures that seemed to be prohibited by Article 
VII (Harrod 1951,512). 
The disagreement was clear and seemingly fundamental, and Keynes left 
Washington without conceding to the State Department position. The diffi- 
culty of Anglo-American negotiations over Article VII led some British offi- 
cials to reconsider the virtues of bilateral bargaining and imperial preferences. 
Leading economists in the British government voiced reservations over bilat- 
eralism in late 1941. About this time, Keynes was also rethinking his views. 
An  American official who knew Keynes during this period notes the change: 
“In his own mind, Keynes had dropped, or was on the verge of dropping, the 
argument that hard bilateral bargaining would have to be resorted to; and he 
was replacing it by a plan for an international institution to deal with balance- 
of-payments questions” (Penrose 1953, 18). Throughout his career, of course, 
Keynes had been of two minds on the virtues of unrestricted trade and mone- 
tary arrangements. One mind showed itself after World War I when he argued 
that free trade was both an economic and a moral imperative. Keynes’s other 
mind argued that goods should be “homespun where it is reasonably and con- 
veniently possible . . . a greater measure of national self-sufficiency and eco- 
nomic isolation among countries than existed in  1914 may  tend to serve the 
cause of peace rather than otherwise” (Robbins 1971, 194). Keynes was ca- 
pable of articulating both restrictionist and expansionist positions on the post- 
war order. In the autumn of  1941, he moved vigorously in the expansionary 
direction. He came to the view that perhaps an agreement could be reached 
with the United States for a monetary order that would be expansionary, an 
order that could keep the trading system open but safeguard against depres- 
sion (Eckes 1975, 65). The search for a postwar settlement involving both a 
relatively open trading system and measures to ensure employment stability 
soon became the preoccupation of  Keynes and other British planners. 
On the American side, as we have seen, there were conflicts between the 
Departments of State and Treasury over postwar planning. The stalemate on 
the postwar economic order, arrived at in the discussions of  trade arrange- 
ments, did not prevent officials at the Treasury from proceeding with monetary 
planning, and, in the process, monetary negotiations became the cutting edge 
of postwar planning. The centrality of monetary planning was due to the ini- 
tial contentiousness of Anglo-American discussions of trade and to the rela- 
tive smoothness with which British and American monetary experts were able 
to find common ground. 
A flurry of  monetary planning broke out on both sides of the Atlantic. In 
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the country to produce his famous plan for an International Clearing Union. 
What emerged was an ambitious plan for far-reaching cooperation in mone- 
tary relations,  involving mechanisms for both the orderly  adjustment of  ex- 
change rates and the mobilization of credit that would prevent the resort to 
deflation  as  a  means  of  correcting  maladjustments.  The Clearing  Union 
would have the authority to create and manage an international currency that 
would be used to manage intercountry balances. This overdraft facility would 
have the authority to create and manage $25-$30  billion  of a new interna- 
tional currency to settle payments balances (Eckes 1975, 66). A key provision 
of Keynes’s Clearing Union was the pressure it sought to put on both deficit 
and  surplus countries  to correct  payments  imbalances; this would  take the 
form of a tax on the excess reserves of creditor nations as well as other mea- 
sures to ensure corrective policies in both surplus and deficit countries. 
American  planning  got under  way  in  early  1942 under  the  direction  of 
Harry Dexter White. The American plan was similar to Keynes’s in its attempt 
to eliminate exchange controls and restrictive financial practices,  and it pro- 
vided rules for alterations in rates of exchange. Although it provided relief for 
monetary  authorities  in  international  difficulties,  it  differed  from  Keynes’s 
plan by proposing relatively modest resources for this purpose and severely 
limiting the  obligations  of creditor nations to contribute to that relief.  The 
Clearing  Union  scheme obligated  creditor nations  to accept a clearing unit 
(bancor)  up to the limit of the amount of this medium.  The White plan re- 
stricted the obligation of creditors to the amount of their subscription with the 
fund. 
These two plans formed the basic framework of negotiations that followed 
throughout 1943 and up to the Bretton Woods conference. Many of the com- 
promises were made in favor of the less ambitious White plan, but many of 
the British demands were also met. The capital was to be subscribed under the 
compromise plan; there would not be a new international currency. Moreover, 
the primary  responsibility  for restoring international equilibrium would fall 
on the deficit countries; it would not, as Keynes has proposed, be shared with 
surplus countries.  The power of member  nations  to change their exchange 
rates was increased in the emerging agreement,  which addressed the British 
interest in  flexibility. Finally,  the attempt in the Keynes  scheme to address 
short-term postwar financial problems was left out of the plan. Wartime debts 
as well as reconstruction  loans would  be dealt with in other bilateral  agree- 
ments and a development bank (Penrose 1953,55-60). 
The crucial breakthrough in Anglo-American negotiations occurred in Sep- 
tember  1943 when the British side agreed to abandon the idea of  “unlimited 
liability” of creditor countries contained in the Clearing Union scheme. Lionel 
Robbins noted later that, “once we had recognized the political unacceptabil- 
11. The initial draft and subsequent versions of the Keynes plan are published in Keynes (1980, 
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ity of the unlimited liability of the creditor,  the rest was a compromise be- 
tween essentially friendly negotiators” (Robbins  1971, 200). After this con- 
cession,  much  of  what  followed  involved practical  adjustments  to  specific 
national interests and domestic politics. 
3.6  Policy Ideas and Political Coalition Building 
The “new thinking” embraced by the Anglo-American planners,  with its 
synthesis of interventionist and liberal goals, has a political resonance within 
wider and more contentious British and American political circles. The Bret- 
ton Woods ideas played a politically integrating role-they  allowed political 
leaders and social groups across the political spectrum to envisage a postwar 
economic order where multiple (and previously  competing) objectives could 
be met simultaneously. The alternatives of the past-of  the nineteenth century 
and of the interwar period-suggested  options that were much too politically 
stark. Outside the narrow transatlantic community of government economists, 
politicians were looking for options that could steer a middle course. In the 
end, the ability of policy experts to articulate ideas that spoke to the needs of 
practical  British and American politicians was the most consequential aspect 
of their work. 
Throughout  their  discussions  with  American  officials,  the  British  were 
looking for a middle ground between bilateralism (and the imperial preference 
system) and laissez-faire. This was noted in a cable from Ambassador Halifax 
to the British Foreign Office in  October  1942, following a visit from John 
Foster Dulles (at the time a corporation lawyer in New York): 
The most interesting point on the economic side of the discussion was Mr. 
Dulles’ exposition of the Cordell Hull school of free trade,  and the place 
which it had in the plans of the Administration. I said to him that I thought 
that we did not clearly understand what the significance of the Hull policies 
was. There was a feeling in some quarters here that we were faced with two 
alternatives, either we must revert to a completely  19th century system of 
laissez-faire,  or else we must safeguard our balance of payments position 
by developing a bilateral system of trade with those countries whose natural 
markets we were. It seemed to me that neither of these courses would work, 
the first was clearly impossible, the second might be disastrous. I asked Mr. 
Dulles whether there might not be some middle course which would take 
account of our special difficulties and which at the same time would satisfy 
Mr. Cordell Hull on the question of discrimination, preferences, etc.12 
If  we  are looking  for historical  moments  when  political  elites are open to 
intellectuals and experts bearing new policy ideas, here is one. Later in the 
year,  when  Keynes  and  the  British  shifted  negotiating  partners-from  the 
12. Dispatch from Ambassador Halifax to the Foreign Office, 21 (?) October 1942, London, 
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State Department (and trade policy) to the Treasury (and monetary policy)- 
opportunities for finding that middle ground emerged. 
In both Britain and the United States, the onset of a major war stimulated 
and widened political debate on the future of the world economic order. Even 
before the war, politicians and editorialists on the left and the right had staked 
out a wide range of positions on the proper direction of world trade and mon- 
etary order. In American liberal and progressive circles, as seen, for example, 
in the pages of the New Republic and the Nation, wartime views affirmed the 
goals of full employment and economic planning and included calls for post- 
war world economic federation and multilateral cooperation. Liberal and pro- 
gressive spokesmen  stressed different goals:  some advanced vague commit- 
ments to liberals internationalism,  others favored  the primacy  of economic 
planning,  and still others reaffirmed a commitment to free trade. Most com- 
mentators agreed that a new economic  order must be built;  there was little 
agreement on what that meant. 
Once the Bretton Woods proposals were on the table, however, the various 
liberal and  progressive  commentators  largely fell in line behind  the agree- 
ment. Keynesian planners saw the agreement as an attempt to bring Keynesian 
management to the world economy; free traders saw a commitment to trade 
expansion;  internationalists  saw few alternatives.  Indeed, it  is striking how 
quickly the various  alternatives  to Bretton Woods disappeared  from public 
debate after 1944. As both a practical and an intellectual matter, few economic 
planners or internationalists saw any real alternative to Bretton Woods. More- 
over, the coalition against Bretton Woods-New  York bankers, high-tariff ad- 
vocates,  silverites, and isolationists-were  soon seen as an odd bunch, out- 
side the political mainstream (see “Support for Bretton Woods” 1945). 
In Britain, the Bretton Woods proposals also played a politically integrating 
role. This can be seen when  tracing editorial commentary  during the  late- 
1930s and the war in the Spectator, a conservative free trade journal. There is 
no praise of economic planning and little discussion of British full employ- 
ment policy. Commentary on the great tools of planning and ending the busi- 
ness cycle are absent.  Supported were free trade and a new economic order 
for Europe  (see Sterling  1941). Nonetheless,  the Bretton  Woods proposals 
seemed to meet Spectator’s needs.  Only favorable discussions of  the White 
and Keynes proposals appeared in the two years leading up to the agreement 
(see “Currency and Trade” 1943). As the war began, the Economist, another 
conservative free trade journal, stressed the need for postwar economic coop- 
eration with the United States. During the war, the editorial voice of the Econ- 
omist was unclear in defining postwar economic problems and solutions.13  In 
the  end, the  editors  supported  Bretton  Woods,  but  argued that  its  success 
13. The Economist  clearly favored multilateralism to blocs and bilateral trade. By the end of 
the war, its editors argued that the world needed to move toward “managed free trade” (see “The 
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would depend on all sorts of other adjustments and changes in the way nations 
conduct their economic business. 
In Britain and the United States, the Bretton Woods proposals represented 
a “middle way” that generated support from both the conservative free traders 
and the new prophets of  economic planning. Wartime economic “new think- 
ing” helped refine the political mainstream, making possible new coalitions. 
Like a piece of crystal, the Bretton Woods agreement had many different sur- 
faces-it  projected different things to different groups. No other internation- 
alist proposal could command such a broad coalition. 
3.7  Conclusion 
The question asked here is, How do we explain the Anglo-American settle- 
ment?  Why  did  certain  proposals  become  an  effective  basis  for  Anglo- 
American agreement, and how,  given the divergent and conflicting national 
and bureaucratic positions, was agreement achieved within a wider and frag- 
mented political setting? The argument is that agreement was fostered by  a 
community of  experts composed of  liberally minded British and American 
economists and policy specialists who shared a set of technical and normative 
views about the desirable features of the international monetary order and who 
were given remarkable autonomy to negotiate a deal. This community of ex- 
perts fostered agreement by altering the political debate about postwar policy: 
they crystallized areas of common interest between the two governments, and 
they elaborated a set of  politically resonant ideas that served to build larger 
coalitions within and between governments. These arguments can be exam- 
ined further. 
3.7.1 
All  increments of  historical time  are  not  equal.  There are junctures or 
“breakpoints” when possibilities for major change are particularly great and 
the scope of  possible outcomes unusually wide. In  this century, the several 
years surrounding 1945 would  surely be one such moment. Nobody knew 
how the world order would be reorganized, but everybody believed that reor- 
ganization was inevitable. The ending of  a major war or the aftermath of  a 
large-scale economic crisis alters the parameters of  policy-making: dissatis- 
faction with past policy creates a new willingness on the part of political lead- 
ers to reevaluate their interests, goals, and doctrines; disruptions and break- 
downs of  rules  and  institutions create a need  for nonincremental decision 
making; and the collapse of old political coalitions requires a search for new 
coalitions. At these moments, the removal of obstacles of change occurs si- 
multaneously with the presence of impulses to change. When this happens on 
a global scale, fundamental change is possible. 
At these critical turning points, the interests and capacities of the dominant 
groups, states, and classes matter, as they always do, but uncertainties about 
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power  structures  and dissatisfactions  with  prevailing  definitions  of  interests 
create opportunities for the recasting of interests. At the core of the postwar 
settlement were British and American political leaders who were open to the 
redefinition  of  national  economic policy  interests.  Keynes, White, and the 
other “new thinkers” were particularly well situated to shape the resolution of 
these uncertainties: the transgovernmental “alliance” that they formed allowed 
them  to  shape the  agenda, taking  the  initiative away from the  free trade- 
oriented State Department;  the complexity of the issues gave them  a privi- 
leged  position  to advance proposals;  and their ideas were  particularly  well 
suited to building winning political coalitions. 
3.7.2  Building New Political Coalitions 
The consensus among British and American monetary experts provided a 
basis  for breaking  through  various  layers of  conflicts  and deadlocks within 
and between the British and American governments.  Most immediately, the 
consensus among Anglo-American  experts cut through conflicts by  shifting 
the ground of debate from trade to monetary issues. In a more general way, 
the monetary agreement served the purpose of political compromise by artic- 
ulating ideas that created possibilities for new political coalitions. The policy 
ideas embraced by Anglo-American experts, not fully available in an earlier 
era, provided a solid intellectual foundation for a political middle ground be- 
tween an unregulated open system and bilateral or regional groupings. This is 
the  point  made by  Albert  Hirschman  about  Keynesianism:  that  economic 
ideas  “can  supply  an  entirely  new  common  ground  for positions  between 
which there existed no middle ground whatsoever” (Hirschman 1989, 356). It 
was  the  British  (Keynes  in  particular)  who  were  most  intent on finding  a 
middle ground-something  that in the early Anglo-American discussions of 
postwar trade arrangements seemed so elusive. The Bretton Woods agreement 
articulated  a middle  position  between  a nineteenth-century-style  free trade 
system and regional or national capitalist arrangements. The policy views of 
the monetary experts were intellectually synthetic and politically robust: they 
provided a respectable position between extremes and thereby set the stage for 
political  compromise between British and American governments,  and they 
foreshadowed  (and  perhaps  enabled)  a broader  sociopolitical reordering  of 
coalitions within postwar Western capitalist democracies. 
Policy ideas do more than simply “enlighten” political elites. They have a 
political  as well  as a cognitive impact. They provide opportunities for new 
coalitions of interests, or at least they can give intellectual force or inspiration 
to those groupings.  Ideas do change minds, but it is their practical  value in 
solving political dilemmas that gives them a force in history. 
3.7.3  Legitimating American Power 
American leaders certainly wanted to promote American interests, and they 
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detect a desire on the part of many officials to promulgate a postwar system 
that would have a normative appeal to elites in other nations. American offi- 
cials realized that building the international economic order on a coercive ba- 
sis would be costly and ultimately counterproductive. This is not to say that 
the United States did not exercise hegemonic power; it is to say that there were 
real limits to the coercive pursuit of the American postwar agenda. Historical 
records do show that American officials wanted to avoid looking as if they 
were imposing policies on the Europeans. This general observation helps ex- 
plain why American officials paid more than insignificant attention to the nor- 
mative bases of the postwar  settlement and why they  were willing to make 
adjustments along the way to give the system a certain legitimacy. 
3.7.4  A Question of Timing 
Finally, it is reasonable to ask why this policy community did not emerge 
earlier-after  World War I or between the wars-and  play a role in fostering 
international economic agreement. There are several reasons. To begin with, 
in these  earlier  periods,  the range of  legitimate policy  views  on monetary 
relations was much wider. The experiences of the 1930s were crucial in dis- 
crediting  monetary  ideas  associated  with  floating  exchange  rates  (Ode11 
1989). The lessons  learned  by  British economists  and politicians  from the 
disastrous return to the gold standard in 1925 were also crucial in narrowing 
the range of expert views.  Moreover,  the war itself gave economic planners 
an opportunity  for devising international rules and institutions in a way not 
fully available in the 1930s. The war also served to attract economists into the 
British and American governments,  most of whom were trained in the “new 
thinking .”  The formation  of  an influential  community  of  Anglo-American 
monetary experts had to wait for these developments. 
Beyond these immediate factors, there were more diffuse shifts in thinking 
among British and American elites concerning the virtues and necessities of 
internationalism.  Paradoxically,  much of this new value attached to interna- 
tional institutions (and, in particular, the perceived necessity of striking a deal 
between the United States and Britain) sprang from the progressive rise in the 
social obligations undertaken by the modem welfare state. Full employment, 
economic stabilization,  and social welfare-these  were goals that repeatedly 
found their way into discussions of the postwar economic order during the 
early 1940s, in popular journals, in Congress and Parliament, and in Anglo- 
American planning deliberations. Nothing similar was evident in 191  8, where 
the rapid return to laissez-faire and the automatic forces of economic life were 
the order of the day. Between the wars, the sociopolitical underpinnings of the 
modem state had changed. As a result, the elites who commanded the British 
and American governments in  1945 had a different set of perceptions of and 
goals for the postwar order than their predecessors had in 1918. In this sense, 
the “demand” for new ideas was greater the second time around. At the same 
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States that  might favor internationalist  solutions to problems of  postwar re- 
construction was also larger the second time around. What was needed was an 
intellectual and political basis for coalition building on a grand scale, and this 
is what the Keynesian “new thinkers” provided. 
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Comment  John S. Odell 
G.  John Ikenberry  argues that the Bretton Woods system, rather than some 
alternative monetary  arrangement, emerged  at the end of World War  I1 be- 
cause a transnational group of experts fashioned an idea that was able to at- 
tract larger, winning political coalitions inside the United States and Britain, 
the dominant monetary powers. Political leaders of  the time were seeking an 
John S. Odell is professor of international relations at the University of  Southern California and 
editor of Internaiional Organization. 183  The Political Origins of  Bretton Woods 
as yet unspecified “middle ground” between other, flawed approaches, and the 
expert community responded with an idea that would therefore succeed in 
domestic politics. Presumably, Ikenberry means that, absent this community 
and its idea,  some alternative monetary arrangement would probably have 
taken root. 
Ikenberry accepts that states and politicians act more or less rationally in 
their own interests, but he finds that interests are not identified sufficiently in 
simplified a priori models of public choice. Instead, our models must be  en- 
larged to encompass how people choose one definition of their interests rather 
than another and how politics works to produce new policies and institutions. 
Ikenberry shows that actual Americans held more than one conception of their 
nation’s interests regarding postwar international economic arrangements- 
contrary to the a priori assumptions of the hegemony theory of economic pol- 
icy and institutions and other theories. The British were divided as well. Once 
the plan was publicized, popular opinion tended to gravitate toward it  and 
away from other ideas that had been prominent until then. 
Reading this paper led me to ask myself  about other cases since 1944 in 
which  experts  offered international monetary reform proposals,  always in 
their nation’s interests, of course. Politicians have adopted some of these plans 
too, but not others. For example, leaders eventually adopted the special draw- 
ing right (SDR), the European snake, the European Monetary System, and 
1988 banking capital adequacy standards.  Among those not adopted (at least 
not for many years) were Friedman’s early and lonely advocacy of  floating, 
the  late  1960s schemes  for  limited  exchange  rate  flexibility  worldwide, 
Ethier’s reference rate proposal for managing floating, Williamson’s “target 
zone” system, proposals to retire the dollar from its reserve role and to create 
a substitution account in the IME2  and calls to return to the gold standard. 
One wonders whether any general hypotheses could help differentiate be- 
tween governments’ varying responses to monetary reform plans and whether 
the 1944 case generates any broader lessons in this regard. The balance of this 
brief Comment is a set of speculations on this issue. 
Of course, Ikenberry has noted that 1944 was an unusual historic juncture 
in which “disruptions and breakdowns of  rules and institutions create[d] a 
need for nonincremental decision making.” In later peacetime periods lacking 
upheavals as fundamental as world war, it was naturally more difficult to enact 
sweeping change. This difference might help us understand subsequent nega- 
tive responses, but not positive ones. 
Also limited as a generalization is one of  Keynes’s own notions that his 
plan benefited from being “so damn boring,” compared to more colorful issues 
1. On  the  1988 banking capital adequacy standards, see Ethan B. Kapstein, “Resolving the 
Regulator’s Dilemma: International Coordination of Banking Regulations,” International Orga- 
nization 43 (Spring 1989): 323-47. 
2. See Joanne Gowa, “Hegemons, IOs, and Markets: The Case of the  Substitution Account,” 
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such as trade policy on which  much stronger opposing coalitions could  be 
mobilized. To be sure, difficulty in understanding which interests will be af- 
fected does change the political process of ratifying technical agreements. In 
this  1944 case, however, some vested interests in the United States did fight 
vigorously to block passage of the enabling legislation. Moreover, many later 
monetary proposals, both those adopted and those overlooked, were surely as 
boring as Bretton Woods, to the general public. There might be a long-term 
trend at work, however, whereby at least interest groups and politicians, if not 
the general public, pay increasingly sustained attention to international mon- 
etary and debt reform, for better or worse, than they did fifty years ago. This 
speculation would require more investigation. 
This said, one condition that did make the Keynes-White plan superior po- 
litically to its actual rivals was that most of the known alternative policies had 
been  severely  discredited  by  the  failure  of  policy  experiments.  The same 
might not be said of all later reform contests.  Of course, scientists can and 
have interpreted the interwar experience differently. But it is quite predictable 
that future public opinion, too, will crystallize around a particular interpreta- 
tion of contemporary experience and that it will be biased toward preventing 
one’s own last “war” or debacle rather than reasoning from many other histor- 
ical analogues available  worldwide.  While the  1944 weakness of  monetary 
alternatives was probably unusual historically, in both degree and comprehen- 
siveness,  generally one of the most  favorable times to promote any reform 
plan is soon after an experience that can be construed as disconfirming one or 
more rival policies. 
Second, according  to Ikenberry,  politicians  of  the day  were looking for 
a “middle ground,” and the content of  Bretton Woods was near the middle 
of  the relevant spectrum. Presumably,  schemes that address leaders’ current 
demands will always be more influential than any that ignore the customer. 
This is  not  to  say,  of  course,  that  all  designers  should  always  disregard 
issues that are below the top of the current political  agenda. Those agendas 
shift,  sometimes  quickly,  and,  when  they  do,  a  technically  sound  pro- 
posal  ready to be  advanced on short notice will enjoy a competitive edge. 
Keynes,  after  all,  had  been  preaching  for  years  before  his  international 
ideas-spelled  out rather clearly in April  1933-were  finally implemented 
politically. 
From the study of one case we cannot be sure whether the dominant influ- 
ence was this match with current political demand or the centrist content of 
the plan.  Spatial models of choice would always imply some survey of  the 
political opinion spectrum and give the nod to the best-located plan. Such an 
idea might attract sufficient support away from its rivals even if the latter have 
not been as discredited as the gold standard and floating rates were in  1944. 
Nevertheless, a similar caveat applies. The actual process is a dynamic one, 
in which advocates attempt to reshape the opinion curve itself. 
On this second point, the paper would be more convincing, in my opinion, 185  The Political Origins of Bretton Woods 
if  it included  more concrete evidence of the political demand for a middle 
ground and more evidence  of  the  degree of domestic  support for the  rival 
plans. The evidence presented is consistent with the argument, but more thor- 
ough comparative research on this central point seems feasible. 
Third, for Ikenbeny, the Bretton Woods plan was not formulated by a single 
author; rather, it was influenced by a transnational community of experts, in- 
side and outside the two governments.  Research would be needed to investi- 
gate whether in general the presence of  a transnational expert community is 
systematically  associated  with policy  success. Such a community  seems to 
have formed, more or less, on behalf  of  greater but  limited exchange rate 
flexibility  in the late  1960s, but was evidently not sufficient. Perhaps a key 
difference was that the convinced community in that case included too few 
members inside governments. In any case, Ikenberry has not claimed that this 
transnational community condition will be sufficient alone. 
One special, fourth, condition in 1944 was that the plan was also identified 
with an increasingly famous prophet.  Keynes’s  1923 Tract on Monetary Re- 
form had probed the weaknesses of the gold standard, and “within a decade,” 
Harrod writes,  “Keynes’ position had won the allegiance of  at least half the 
world.”j In the 1933 book The Means to Prosperity, Keynes proposed inter- 
national cooperation in a form that foreshadowed the IMF. Likewise, in future 
competitions among ideas, any plan that enjoys an association with accurate 
past  forecasts of alternative policies’  failures will likely have an advantage 
again. 
The Bretton Woods case also hints at a fifth hypothesis,  namely, that the 
idea that prevails  politically  will be the one supported by  the most skillful 
negotiation  strategy.  Not  all plans promoted  by  one or another government 
have produced  intergovernmental  agreements,  even  when  agreement could 
benefit both sides. More is involved in the outcome than the negotiators’ strat- 
egy choices, but this case does seem to suggest the utility of approaching one 
or two dominant powers first, bringing them to agreement, and only then in- 
volving third governments.  Most of the negotiating had been completed by 
the time the delegates arrived at the Mount Washington HoteL4 In 1987, the 
Federal Reserve and the Bank of England followed the same “bilateral-first” 
sequence in producing the Group of Ten accord on bank capital. To  be sure, 
multilateral negotiation may often be necessary, both for technical reasons and 
to reflect adequately the interests of smaller parties.  Cases such as the  1985 
Plaza agreement indicate that “multilateral first” may also produce agreement. 
More careful research would be needed to establish any firm generalizations 
on this question as well. 
Finally,  Ikenberry’s  paper  ends without  discussing  the  struggle over the 
3. R. F. Harrod, The Life of  John Maynard Keynes (London: Macmillan, 1966), 339. 
4. Stanley W.  Black, A Levite among the Priests: Edward M. Bernstein and the Origins of  the 
Bretton Woods System (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), 42-47. 186  G. John Ikenberry 
Bretton Woods agreement’s ratification, a stage that was decisive in producing 
the monetary system we discuss today. This is not a criticism of the paper, but 
the final act is also instructive. The Roosevelt administration submitted a bill 
to Congress that would enable the United States to play the role that the exec- 
utive had designed for itself, but Congress’s approval was not at all guaran- 
teed. In March  1945, the chairman of  the House Banking Committee told 
Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau that a majority on this key committee 
opposed the bill, and Winthrop Aldrich of New York’s Chase Bank, one of the 
harshest critics, was certain it would fail. A ratification failure would have 
duplicated President Wilson’s unhappy experience with the Versailles Treaty 
twenty-six years earlier. 
Precisely that  historical analogy concentrated the administration’s mind, 
which thus set about to avoid the same  mistake^.^ In the first place, Roosevelt 
and Morgenthau personally selected as members of the U.S. delegation stra- 
tegic figures who, if  inspired by  diplomatic experience at the foot of  Mount 
Washington, could provide special assistance during the ratification phase. 
Reversing Wilson’s practice, they included members of Congress, including 
Republican leaders of the committees that would have to consent. After the 
conference,  the  Treasury  staff  retained  a  public  relations  specialist  and 
mounted a truly amazing campaign in localities across the land to generate 
grass-roots support. They helped journalists prepare supportive radio scripts 
and articles, including one in Colliers magazine entitled “Bretton Woods or 
World War 111.” Secretary Morgenthau delivered speeches outside Washington 
touting the local economic benefits that the “boring” reform would bring. The 
American Federation of Retailers sent mailings to  1.8 million stores urging 
citizens to contact Congress on behalf of  Bretton Woods and an end to war. 
As a result of this campaign, by mid-May Congress was receiving citizen mail 
heavily in favor of  this technical bill, and Congress responded accordingly. 
Morgenthau also accepted minor amendments that would permit him to har- 
vest additional favorable votes, in contrast to Wilson’s rigidity. The amended 
bill then passed each house by more than a two-thirds margin. 
Advocates of rival policy ideas do not automatically mount equally power- 
ful persuasion campaigns, and these political contests do affect actual out- 
comes. Politicians and citizens do not necessarily persuade themselves which 
new idea to adopt or which new coalition to join. Therefore, not only careful 
design of the reform itself, historical luck, and skillful international bargain- 
ing matter. In addition, the more extensive and sophisticated the campaign to 
“sell” it to constituents, the greater the chances a reform will be implemented. 
5. See A. E. Eckes, Jr., A Search for Solvency: Bretton Woods and the International Monetary 
System, 1941-1971  (Austin: University of  Texas Press,  1975); and John S. Odell, “From London 
to Bretton Woods: Sources of Change in Bargaining Strategies and Outcomes,” Journal of  Public 
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Shortly before the Bretton Woods conference, a senior lawyer was  loaned 
from the Foreign Office to the small British delegation: just one lawyer. One 
too many, Keynes thought. The lawyer, an ultimately tragic figure, found the 
pressure of work “great and the financial stuff very hard to understand” (Beck- 
ett  1944, entry  for 6 July). Not  surprisingly, he  was  subsequently unsure 
about the meaning of the Fund’s critical Article VIII that he had helped draft 
(Pressnell 1987, 176). 
Then there was Keynes himself. For several months after Bretton Woods he 
agitated himself,  his colleagues, and the chancellor of  the Exchequer over 
whether, in the apparently uncertain light of that article, the British govern- 
ment should be recommended to adopt the agreements that he  had helped 
formulate (Pressnell 1987, 168-82,401-8). 
These reflections suggest some rejigging of  John Ikenberry’s stimulating 
observations  on  the  undoubtedly  remarkable  degree  of  expert  Anglo- 
American involvement in the negotiation of the Bretton Woods agreements. 
Such rejigging may help explain why the Fund’s early history did not match 
the hopes at its creation. 
Three points may be stressed. First, Anglo-American cooperation was very 
much less securely based outside the small group of  experts than within it. 
Second, trade policy requires more attention, by  the opening of  Ikenberry’s 
elliptical allusion to “stalemate .” Zmmobilisme did indeed threaten after the 
fierce Keynes-Acheson encounter of  July  1941, but it did not fully emerge 
until some two years or so later, when Americans and British retreated from 
the  high  hopes  of  their  experts’  Washington  discussions  in  September- 
October 1943. Moreover, trade policy was not pushed aside; it remained “a 
loose cannon,” liable to roll dangerously over a heaving transatlantic deck. 
Third is the question of alternatives to Bretton Woods. Although Ikenberry’s 
assertion that they disappeared from public debate seems appropriate in terms 
of potential competition with the Keynes and White plans, it is less so for the 
practical realities. As with more recent developments, non-IMF monetary ar- 
rangements after 1945 threatened to leave the Fund on the international side- 
lines. 
To  begin with the frail underpinning of  the intellectual alliance, British ex- 
perts at Bretton Woods had to hold back discussing trade policy, about which 
more is said below (Pressnell 1987, 136-37; Robbins 1971, 203-4).  Far from 
least, the British were reluctant to disclose their perplexity about how to deal 
L. S. Pressnell, a monetary historian, has held appointments in economics and economic his- 
tory in British universities. He is currently a member of the Cabinet Office Historical Section. 188  G.  John Ikenberry 
with the massive overseas indebtedness, already some &3  billion ($12 billion) 
of “sterling balances”; again, this is discussed more fully below. 
No  doubt this  reticence  reflected  British  unwillingness  to  admit  to  the 
United  States its junior partner’s weakness lest the senior exploit that. Cer- 
tainly, one detects that wariness in Prime Minister Churchill shortly after the 
enactment of Lend-Lease.  Although he no longer nursed his fears of 1927 of 
a future war with the United States (Gilbert 1979, 1033), he was apprehensive 
of friction. In a revealing dispatch of April 1941, he considered the “suspicion 
and recrimination” darkening the informal and undefined association that had 
evolved  between  Britain and the  United  States. If  such strains could afflict 
cooperation in the current danger, he questioned whether they were likely to 
be diminished when peace came.‘ 
There were difficulties enough at home, where, in Churchill’s coalition cab- 
inet, there was strong opposition to the trade and monetary plans that evolved 
from  1941. Indeed, as the time for Bretton  Woods approached in  1944, the 
hostile faction even sought-unsuccessfully-specific  representation  in the 
British delegation (Pressnell 1987, 156 n. 67). 
In this political  sphere,  however,  Ikenberry  suggests that Bretton  Woods 
was to have  a unifying role.  Was  this perhaps more a dampening down of 
differing negatives than  an onrush of  shared and positive  enthusiasm? The 
Right was haunted by a concern never to be responsible for repeating the de- 
cision of  1925 to adopt an exchange rate apparently too high and too inflex- 
ible.  The Left  endured  complementary  torment: resistance to exchange ar- 
rangements that had as trade-offs large-scale unemployment and repetition of 
the financial-cum-political crisis of  193  1. 
There was, indeed,  not much enthusiasm in the parliamentary debates of 
May 1944 on the “Joint Statement by Experts” that preceded Bretton Woods. 
Keynes was sickened by the fierce anti-Americanism of the House of  Com- 
mons debate (Keynes 1980, 3, 6). Subsequently, the government was able to 
avoid parliamentary debate of the Bretton Woods agreements. Approval was 
to be pushed through with that of the even more strongly disliked, but scarcely 
escapable, Anglo-American Financial Agreement of December  1945, which 
was to provide for Britain’s postwar recovery an interest-bearing line of credit 
of $3.75 billion. 
Even Keynes’s own constructive role must be qualified. At the Atlantic City 
meetings immediately preceding Bretton Woods, he was under instructions to 
secure  that  the  Fund  agreement  would  include  the  essence  of  “the  Catto 
clause” (Lord Catto, formerly an adviser to the chancellor, had recently be- 
come governor of the Bank of England).  This was to safeguard a country’s 
ultimate right over its exchange rate, which Article IV,  sections 5(c)(iii), 5(f), 
and 6, was to recognize (Pressnell 1987, 149-50,  160-61). 
1. Dispatch from Mr. Winston Churchill to  Viscount Halifax (Washington),  10 April  1941, 
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At Bretton Woods, Keynes similarly struggled, although less successfully, 
for a country’s-that  is,  Britain’s-discretion  to restrict  convertibility, not 
only of  accumulated balances, but also of  current receipts in  international 
trade. Britain’s immediate concern was with the substantial sterling balances 
still accumulating as a result of an inability to export sufficiently against goods 
and  supplies from sterling-using countries (the “sterling area”) and others. 
There was also concern about future accumulations that might be expected to 
arise with a reserve currency such as sterling, the expenditure of  which in a 
balance of payments crisis might need to be controlled. The British delegation 
had  been  instructed to secure provisions that  the release of  such balances 
should be limited to those recently acquired and only if  needed for current 
transactions. 
In the event, that is, in Article VIII, section 4, the intended twin conditions 
for the release of  balances became alternative  and therefore weakened re- 
straints. Back in Britain after the conference, Keynes glimpsed unexpected 
horrors in that article once he was persuaded that it would not allow Fund- 
approved restrictions on convertibility of  balances to apply also to current 
transactions. Conclusive elucidation and assurances were eventually obtained 
from Edward M. Bernstein (via the secretary of the treasury, Henry J. Mor- 
genthau). Further, it became apparent that loopholes had been left, pending 
agreement on an international trade charter, for escape from monetary con- 
straints by the use of trade controls. Only then, in  mid-1945, almost a year 
after  Bretton  Woods,  did  he  desist  from  recommending that  the  British 
government reject the Fund agreement that he had done so much to produce 
(Pressnell 1987, 167-82,  401-8).  Even so, by that time British officials were 
doubting whether, for Britain, the IMF had much of a future. 
What of the wider British public? Certainly it was emotionally predisposed to 
international cooperation.  In  pamphlets and  books  and  discussion groups, 
many, echoing thoughts at governmental levels, looked back regretfully at the 
weaknesses of the old League of  Nations and hoped for a much stronger re- 
placement to provide some elements of world government. 
Such  wartime  ruminations  stressed  international political  arrangements 
rather than economic, and in a more general sense than specifically with re- 
spect to Anglo-American relations. Indeed, the long-standing and widespread 
enthusiasm for President Franklin D. Roosevelt was only to a limited extent 
related to international policies. Although there had undoubtedly been a des- 
perate prewar yearning for his leadership to reverse Europe’s drift toward war, 
admiration was  attached rather to  the presumed  virtues of  the New  Deal. 
Away from domestic policy, recollection of the Great Depression fostered de- 
termination to be shielded from its source in the American economy. 
With high tariffs since 1932 supplemented by  wide-ranging controls con- 
structed during the war, the consensus in both major political parties placed 
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rence of  the mass unemployment of  the interwar years. Coupled with  that 
would be greatly extended social services. The greater state intervention in- 
volved seemed a limited problem politically. Indeed, in 1946, Churchill, out 
of  power and leader of  the Opposition, told  senior congressmen that many 
domestic policies of  the Labour government were the same as those of  his 
own Conservative party.2 
The British public’s postwar vision was predominantly inward looking in 
economic matters. If  the postwar Labour governments of  1945-5 1 appeared 
similarly oriented, that reflected not just understandable concern to prevent a 
recurrence of  mass unemployment but  also Labour economists’ perplexity 
about applying socialist principles to international economic policy. Tradition- 
ally, Labour had accepted orthodoxy until the departure from gold in 1931 and 
resort  to protection and preference in  the following year. Pragmatism then 
evolved (Durbin 1985, 251-54,  256, 262), reinforced after the war by surviv- 
ing wartime controls in prolonged balance of  payments difficulties. Bretton 
Woods evoked wariness from Labour, as one of its prolix publicists noted, lest 
domestic policies be compromised, and resentment that adherence to it had 
been the price of the postwar American credit (Cole 1947, 406-8,  509, 664, 
977-88). 
A second  major reflection  on Ikenberry’s paper concerns British  attitudes 
toward  trade policy.  He  stresses the near impasse that resulted partly  from 
familiar tension between the U.S.  Treasury and State Departments, partly 
from British resistance to the multilateral implications of Article VII of Lend- 
Lease.  Were  there  not  wider  influences? Given  inevitable  horse-trading 
among multiple players of multiple trading games, a slower pace in securing 
agreement on commercial policy could have been expected. Moreover, there 
was logical priority in concentrating on monetary stabilization, to ensure that 
constraints on trade restrictions would not be circumvented by resort to equiv- 
alent currency restrictions. 
Differences over trade policy were nevertheless to cloud prospects for mon- 
etary liberalization. Here it  may be noted that Keynes’s ideas and influence 
were less sharp, perhaps more devious, than on the monetary proposals. For 
instance, to deal with balance of  payments disequilibrium, he  strongly fa- 
vored intervention rather than dependence on market forces through exchange 
variation.  Notwithstanding his  recognition of  the  ultimate  importance  of 
Anglo-American cooperation, he sought to retain scope for direct controls on 
imports (Keynes 1980,283-304). 
A forward-looking outcome on trade policy had nevertheless seemed pos- 
sible after the Anglo-American discussions of September-October  1943, with 
the British-inspired agreement among experts on the “Washington principles.” 
2. Report  from the British Embassy in Washington, D.C., 14 March  1946, London, Public 
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Very  soon, however,  apprehensive politicians on both  sides yielded to their 
respective pressure groups, notably from agriculture. The old suspicions re- 
emerged: the British of U.S. tariff and subsidy policies, the American of Brit- 
ish discrimination in trade under the associated-although  in American com- 
ment not always clearly distinguished-systems  of imperial preference and 
the sterling area. 
John Ikenberry identifies a major element in this clouded cooperation when 
citing Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s view: that imperial preference, stem- 
ming largely from the imperial economic conference at Ottawa in  1932, was 
“the  greatest  injury,  in  a  commercial  way,”  that  had  been  inflicted  on the 
United  States during his public life. We can first substitute for Cordell Hull 
almost any British politician or economic historian. Then, for condemnation 
of  imperial preference,  substitute that dramatic roll call two years earlier of 
highly protected American industries, the Smoot-Hawley tariff of  1930. Al- 
though  the  Ottawa  system,  which  discriminated  against  other  countries 
besides the United States, should not be viewed as simply a reaction to Smoot- 
Hawley (Drummond and Hillmer 1989, 16), that undoubtedly became subse- 
quently a ritualistic justification for Britain’s swing toward the general protec- 
tionism that made preference possible. 
Ikenberry rightly stresses that the likely difficulties in the postwar balance 
of payments made imperial preference seem more attractive. Except for vocif- 
erous zealots for a self-contained empire trading bloc, this was not predomi- 
nantly imperial preference for its own sake. The underlying constraint  in re- 
lation  to  the  possibilities  of  a  liberal  trading  order  was  the  expected 
inadequacy of dollar earnings and of international reserves after the war; that 
seemed to require,  unavoidably,  discrimination  in trade  as well  as through 
continued exchange controls. 
There was, however, more to the matter than all this. Formal discrimination 
by imperial preference  seems only partially  to explain the prewar advantage 
of British over American exports to the British Commonwealth (MacDougall 
1952, 506-7,  51  1). To diminish or dispense with it too abruptly would have 
hazarded a much wider proportion of trade than that explicitly favored. Be- 
yond lay much unformalized preference for British goods: from millions  of 
British emigrants or their descendants; from local subsidiaries of leading Brit- 
ish businesses; from central and local governments and their purchasing agen- 
cies in London as well as the crown agents for the colonies. 
One might reasonably  ask whether the American crusade against British 
discrimination in trade and payments  took insufficient account of what was 
involved. Was it pushed too far and too fast for others’ comfort and its own 
success? In the context of Anglo-American cooperation on international eco- 
nomic problems,  did it hazard the prospects of the new International  Mone- 
tary Fund? Such questions arise when considering Britain’s first postwar  fi- 
nancial crisis of  1947. Conventionally described as “the convertibility crisis,” 
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What needs first to be brought into account is that, by the outbreak of war 
in  1939, the formal imperial preference of  only a few years previously  was 
already among the walking wounded.  Just as the British attempt of  1931-32 
at a free-range monetary policy had been capped by the new Roosevelt admin- 
istration, so was the imperial preference structure from  1935: by U.S. trade 
agreements with Canada in  1935 and with both Canada and Britain in  1938 
(Drummond and Hillmer  1989). Although the war thrust the British  agree- 
ment into a kind of limbo, efforts to earn dollars for American war supplies 
were forcing Britain,  even before the enactment of Lend-Lease,  to contem- 
plate cuts in preference against the easing of U.S. restrictions on their exports 
(Pressnell 1987, 21). 
When Lend-Lease from spring 1941 ended that phase, the “Consideration” 
required for that dramatic lifeline offered irresistible leverage against British 
protectionism,  specifically the discrimination of imperial preference. The re- 
sultant  Article  VII  of  the  Mutual  Aid  Agreement  in  1942 exacted  from  a 
doggedly  resistant  British  war cabinet  resentful  agreement to work  toward 
postwar reduction of trade barriers and elimination of discrimination. Shortly, 
however, as Ikenberry has noted, British thinking found possibilities in mul- 
tilateralism internationally if combined with stable employment domestically. 
The eventual  proposals  for liberalized  world  trade,  inspired  largely  by 
James Meade, complemented the imaginative monetary proposals of Keynes 
(who, however, was intensely skeptical about them) and underlay the Wash- 
ington principles already mentioned (Pressnell 1987, 100-101).  In the retreat 
from those, American hostility  toward imperial preference seemed to inten- 
sify, in endeavors to secure virtually its unilateral and uncompensated elimi- 
nation. American attacks helped promote it to symbolic status as one of Brit- 
ain’s few bargaining counters, one that should not be yielded lightly. 
A fragile  compromise  was  reached  during  the  Anglo-American  negotia- 
tions of  September-December  1945 for a postwar line of credit, which was 
tied to fulfillment of Article VII. Although the skilled British negotiators of 
the trade policy aspects had insisted on reciprocity for cuts in preference and 
withheld commitment on reduction,  let alone unilateral elimination, they of- 
fered undertakings  that there  should be no new preferences or increases in 
existing margins (Pressnell 1987,277-78,326-28). 
A crunch on the underlying principle of  nondiscrimination approached in 
summer 1947, with the simultaneous culmination of the Geneva trade negoti- 
ations (which led to the signing in October of the General Agreement on Tar- 
iffs and Trade) and a British balance of  payments crisis.  As mid-July  1947 
approached,  when Fund convertibility was required by the Anglo-American 
Financial Agreement of  1945, discrimination had been envisaged by British 
officials and ministers as essential: to support that early convertibility and to 
stem  a  gathering  sterling  crisis.  In Geneva,  however,  U. S. representatives 
pressed hard for acceptance of early constraints on discrimination. 
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forthwith, flatly refused. He rejected accommodation by  some meaningless 
fudge; that “would be  a hoax.” The British signature was secured only by 
incorporation of  clearly relaxed conditions (Foreign Relations of the  United 
States 1973, 970,  1022). By then, however, the fierce Geneva struggle over 
discrimination had turned attention to the alternative of suspending Fund con- 
vertibility itself. That dramatic action, effectively immobilizing some 40 per- 
cent of the Fund’s main resources, overshadowed the issue of  discrimination 
in  which,  notwithstanding all that  had  gone before, the United  States ac- 
quiesced as a means of returning sterling eventually to convertibility. 
My  third query concerns the alternatives to Bretton Woods that, Ikenberry 
remarks, were shunted to one side. Certainly, the “key currency” approach- 
under which, in a blend of the interwar gold exchange standard and the Tri- 
partite Agreement of  1936, the leading currencies would be stabilized, with 
lesser currencies flexibly attached to them-seemed  to be a nonstarter (Horse- 
field 1969, 1: 17-18).  Were there, however, serious miscalculations, stemming 
partly from the frequently reiterated U.S. belief in a postwar transition much 
briefer than considered feasible on the British side? Was  there a particular 
miscalculation by the U.S. Treasury, or at least by Harry White, shortly after 
Bretton Woods? 
In rejecting the key currency approach, White drastically understated the 
significance of  the pound sterling when he narrowly assessed its role as an 
international currency in terms,  not of  the 50 percent of  international trade 
that it financed, but of the 15 percent represented by strictly British trade, That 
was  to  ignore the  sterling-based arrangements of  over one-third of  world 
trade. By  doing that, and by  adding America’s  12 percent of world trade to 
Britain’s 15 percent, White reached the somewhat spurious figure for the 70- 
odd percent of world trade for which he optimistically declared the new Fund 
and Bank would provide necessary stability (White 1945,206). 
In practice, Britain was determined to sustain and indeed to extend the use 
of sterling. Massive sterling balances, in default of significant cancellation or 
funding or transfer to other and firm holders, might swamp Britain’s exiguous 
reserves and shrunken export capacity. Accordingly, well before the Bretton 
Woods agreements were ratified and put into effect, the British Treasury was 
developing prewar and wartime financial arrangements into a network of pay- 
ments  agreements,  with  substantial credit  swings (Bank  for  International 
Settlements 1945, 96-107). 
American officials had realized that accumulated sterling balances might 
tempt  Britain to  discriminate in  favor of  sterling rather than dollar trade, 
underpinning the imperial preference system, and deplored such bilateralism 
(Pressnell 1987,84, 202). Why, then, did not Anglo-American proposals seek 
to stave off that threat to postwar monetary and trade liberalization? 
An early draft of the U. S. Stabilization Fund had indeed proposed a scheme 
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Britain,  however, eventually held off, fearing to replace a sterling debt with 
one in dollars, and apprehensive that to load the Fund with such debts would 
immobilize it at the outset. An acceptable alternative solution did not emerge 
either by the time of the 1944 conference or subsequently. During the confer- 
ence, two of Britain’s biggest creditors, India and Egypt, threatened an acri- 
monious debate on the issue. Their representatives were somewhat reassured 
behind  the scenes and onstage by the one definite commitment on balances. 
Conveyed by Keynes on behalf of Britain’s chancellor of the Exchequer, and 
known later in India as “the Keynes pledge,” it affirmed that there would be 
no unilateral  repudiation; they were debts to be settled honorably  (Pressnell 
1987, 162-67;  The Transfer ofpower 1976,880-81,917-19). 
Intriguing from a British viewpoint was the American tendency to regard 
cancellation of sterling balances as both appropriate and simple.  Such treat- 
ment of the desperately poor countries that largely held them would have re- 
sembled the alleged exploitative behavior for which imperial Britian was rou- 
tinely  assailed.  In  India,  for  instance,  that  would  have  invited  serious 
disturbances. 
Conceivably, the Keynes pledge explains the near insouciance of Treasury 
Secretary Morgenthau  and  Harry White, after Bretton  Woods,  toward  Brit- 
ain’s otherwise  alarming  overhang  of  debt  (Morgenthau  1945,  189; White 
1945, 207). Without that, Britain’s balance of payments problem after the war 
might have been more closely limited to the current account and less one of 
increased burdens on capital account. Within less than a year, however, in the 
Anglo-American financial negotiations of  1945, White (Morgenthau had re- 
cently handed over to Judge Fred  Vinson) was displaying  anxiety. He now 
favored a drastic scheme for “discounting” sterling debt, comparable to pro- 
posals aired in recent years for dealing with Third World debt (Pressnell 1987, 
288-92;  Corden 1988). That proved  a nonstarter for the U.S. Treasury and 
would probably also have been for the British Treasury. 
The absence of an acceptable scheme was to underpin the policy of running 
sterling as a key currency. The convertibility failure of 1947 was to reinforce 
that stress on using the sterling area to protect Britain’s balance of payments. 
These developments meant that the Anglo-American experts had failed to 
sideline effectively a major alternative to Bretton Woods. Like Britain’s hesi- 
tant support for the new  international economic organization and  its reluc- 
tance to abandon discrimination, that should cause little surprise. The experts 
who devised the Fund and the Bank not surprisingly had more rapport than 
the feuding politicians and divided electorates on whom fulfillment depended. 
Can students of international monetary relations seriously expect more than a 
few forward steps at any one time, or indeed over a very long period? Bretton 
Woods  was  indeed  a  historic  compromise.  The  Anglo-American  experts 
pointed the way to that in exceptional fashion, as John Ikenberry has so illu- 
minatingly recounted. 195  The Political Origins of  Bretton Woods 
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General Discussion 
Much of  the discussion was over the role of  the  Soviet Union at Bretton 
Woods. Edward M.  Bernstein spoke at length on the subject and we include 
his remarks. 
The Soviet Union and Bretton Woods 
The Keynes and White plans for the international monetary system were pro- 
posed in 1943-the  midst of  the war. It was necessary, therefore, that all the 
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allies participate  in the discussions that would precede a formal agreement. 
After the White plan was published,  the Treasury asked the Soviet Union to 
send technical experts to discuss the U.S. proposal. Within a few weeks, the 
Soviet ambassador,  Andrei Gromyko, brought two experts to the Treasury. 
Their function, he said, was to listen to our explanation of the White plan, but 
not to offer suggestions of their own. 
When the United States and the United Kingdom agreed in April  1944 on 
the Joint Statement of Experts on the Establishment  of an International Mon- 
etary Fund, the Soviet Union was asked to approve the statement, although it 
had not taken part in the drafting. It was also asked to publish the statement in 
Moscow  simultaneously  with  its  publication  in  Washington  and  London. 
When the decision was made to hold a United Nations Monetary and Financial 
Conference at Bretton Woods on 1 July 1944, the Soviet Union was informed 
of this before President Roosevelt sent invitations to the other countries. 
The technical experts of the United States and the United Kingdom met in 
Atlantic  City before the  Bretton Woods conference.  This was necessary  in 
order to give  specific  content to the principles of  the  Joint  Statement.  Al- 
though the United States and the United Kingdom had discussed the proposal 
for an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, they had not 
yet agreed on establishing such a bank. The invitation to the Bretton Woods 
conference stated that it  was “for the purpose of  formulating proposals of a 
definite character for an international monetary fund and possibly a bank for 
reconstruction  and development.”  At Atlantic  City, the United Kingdom in- 
formed  us that it and  the governments-in-exile  in London were in favor of 
establishing the bank, and it was placed on the agenda of the Bretton Woods 
conference. 
In the very early days of  the conference, the Soviet delegation confronted 
us with two problems.  The committee on Fund quotas proposed a quota of 
$800 million  for the Soviet Union.  The Soviet delegation claimed that Mr. 
White had  promised them a quota of more than  $1 billion.  Apparently, the 
Soviet delegation was referring to a press conference at the Treasury when the 
White plan was published. In answer to a question on the size of  quotas, Mr. 
White said that the U.S. quota would be about $2.5 billion, the British quota 
about half that, the Soviet quota about $1 billion, and the Chinese quota about 
$800 million. It was a mistake to use these figures. I suggested to White that 
he qualify his statement by saying that these figures were merely illustrative 
and that the quotas of all countries would depend on the size of the Fund. 
The Soviet delegation also objected to the requirement  that 25 percent  of 
the quota be paid in gold. It argued that countries that had suffered destruction 
in  the  war ought  to be  exempt from the  gold payment  or,  at least, have it 
substantially reduced. We knew that, if the gold subscription were reduced for 
the Soviet Union, it would have to be reduced for the United Kingdom and the 
occupied countries. This would be difficult to do, as the gold subscription was 
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The U.S.  delegation considered the Soviet requests. White suggested that 
we remain firm on the size of the quota, but agree to reduce the gold subscrip- 
tion for countries that had suffered from enemy action. Mr. Acheson said that, 
if  we offered this compromise, the Soviet delegation would thank us for re- 
ducing the gold subscription, but it would still insist on having a larger quota. 
He recommended that we stand firm on the committee recommendations on 
both the quota and the gold subscription. In the end, no concession was made 
on the gold subscription,  but the quota of the Soviet Union was increased to 
$1.2 billion.  This was only $100 million  less than the quota for the United 
Kingdom and all the dependent British territories. 
The Soviet Union wanted  to be free of  the obligation of  members on ex- 
change rates. It argued that its exchange rate was merely an accounting unit 
for stating in rubles the receipts and payments of  its foreign trade  sector. It 
wanted freedom to change the exchange rate without the approval of the Fund. 
The conference accepted this view, and the Articles of Agreement state that “a 
member may change the par value of its currency without the concurrence of 
the  Fund  if  the  change does not affect the  international transactions of  its 
members.”  The most important provision to which the Soviet Union agreed 
was to supply the Fund with an extended list of statistical data. 
I had a run-in with a Soviet delegate in the closing days of the conference. 
The Fund  Commission  had  appointed  an  ad  hoc  Committee  on  Unsettled 
Questions on which the Soviet Union was represented. The committee agreed 
on how to deal with the questions that had been referred to it, with the Soviet 
delegate abstaining. He took the position that the committee could not report 
on these questions until he had instructions from Moscow. I suggested that the 
committee recommendations  were tentative, to be reconsidered if  they were 
not approved by Moscow. This did not satisfy the Soviet delegate, and he filed 
a formal protest. In fact, Moscow did not object to the committee report, and 
it was approved in a plenary session of the Fund Commission. 
Although the Soviet Union signed the Final Act of  the Conference,  some 
people  questioned  whether  it  would  cooperate  with  the  United  States and 
other members of the Fund. They noted that, over the past four hundred years, 
the strongest power on the Continent had usually tried to become the master 
of Europe. This happened once with Spain, twice with France, and twice with 
Germany.  They thought that the Soviet Union would follow the same path. 
After invasion in two world wars, the Soviet Union could rationalize  such a 
policy as a search for absolute security. At the Treasury, we thought that, be- 
cause the Soviet Union had suffered such heavy losses, it would give prece- 
dence to reconstruction rather than to establishing dominance in Europe. 
Soon after the war ended, the Soviet Union asked the United States for a 
$10 billion  loan. This was an enormous sum for that time, when the gross 
national product was only slightly more than $200 billion. Even if the admin- 
istration had been willing to make a sizable loan to the Soviet Union, it did 
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the Treasury knew that it would have to extend a loan to Britain, it felt that it 
could not ask Congress for additional funds for the Soviet Union. As an alter- 
native, the United States offered the Soviet Union a $1 .O  billion loan from the 
Export-Import Bank. The Soviet Union turned down the offer. 
After this, the Soviet Union decided not to ratify the Bretton Woods Agree- 
ment. When Secretary Vinson appeared before the Senate Banking Commit- 
tee in support of  the British loan, he was asked whether the loan would divide 
the world in two. He replied that the world was already divided in two and 
that the loan to Britain would prevent the world from being further fragmented 
on trade and finance.  Still, when the United States decided  to establish the 
Marshall Plan, the Soviet Union was invited to join the United Kingdom and 
France in formulating plans for the economic recovery of Europe. The Soviet 
Union declined  to participate in the Marshall Plan, and it prevented Poland 
and Czechoslovakia from joining the Plan. 
The Soviet Union had excluded itself from all the postwar arrangements. It 
was under pressure, however, to provide similar facilities for Eastern Europe. 
It formed the Comecon, described as an organization  for mutual economic 
assistance. It proposed  to improve the trading arrangements through the use 
of  a  so-called  transferable  ruble. It even considered  a plan  to establish  an 
International  Bank for Economic Cooperation, which would issue an exter- 
nally convertible ruble based on deposits of gold and hard currencies.  These 
were not  the institutions  that other Eastern European countries  wanted.  In- 
stead, some of them became members of the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank. In the Soviet Union itself, before perestroika and glasnost, 
the economists of the Academy of  Sciences asked me what the Soviet Union 
would  have to do to qualify for membership in the International  Monetary 
Fund. 
What a costly detour the Soviet Union has traveled since Bretton Woods to 
seek now the membership in the Fund and Bank that it rejected in 1945! 